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INTRODUCTION
On March 18, 1993, the Consortium for the National EqualJustice
Library, comprised of the American Bar Association, the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA), and the American
Association of Law Libraries, along with the Washington College of
Law of The American University presented a program to commemo-
rate the thirtieth anniversary of the landmark Supreme Court case,
Gideon v. Wainwright. Gideon established that any indigent criminal
defendant prosecuted in a state court is entitled to legal representa-
tion provided by the state.
In addition to celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of the Gideon
decision, the program introduced the National Equal Justice Library.
This new institution has as its honorary co-chairs Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr., the Honorable Sargent Shriver, and former Senator
Warren Rudman. It is to be housed at the Washington College of
Law and will serve as a resource for the study and advancement of
legal representation of those unable to afford counsel. When fully
operational in the Washington College of Law's new law center, the
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National EqualJustice Library will contain a comprehensive collection
of materials, including unpublished correspondence and memoranda,
relating to the development of legal services for Americans who
cannot afford to hire an attorney.
The program was hosted by Elliott Milstein, Dean of the Washing-
ton College of Law, and moderated by Richard Wilson, Clinical
Professor of Law at the Washington College of Law. Justice William
J. Brennan, Jr. served as an honored guest throughout the proceed-
ing. Earl Johnson, Jr., Justice of the California Court of Appeal and
President of the Consortium for the National Equal Justice Library
offered introductory remarks. Following Justice Johnson were
remarks by Brooksley E. Born, Chair of the Pro Bono Committee of
the firm of Arnold & Porter, which served as pro bono counsel for
petitioner Clarence Earl Gideon. E.G. Marshall, an actor and star of
the television series, "The Defenders," offered a salute to Justice
William Brennan for his many contributions to the goal of equal
justice for all. Anthony Lewis, a columnist for The New York Times and
author of Gideon's Trumpet, delivered the keynote address, sharing
anecdotes about Clarence Gideon and hailing the great work of the
many lawyers working for equal justice.
After Lewis' address, a panel of four provided recollections,
viewpoints, and discussion about the right to counsel established by
Gideon. Abe Krash of Arnold & Porter and ProfessorJohn Hart Ely,
Professor of Law at Stanford University, discussed their experiences
working on the case with the late Abe Fortas, counsel for Clarence
Gideon. Bruce R Jacob, Dean of Stetson University College of Law,
shared his views as counsel for the State of Florida in the Gideon case.
Finally, AngelaJordan Davis, Director of the Public Defender Service
in the District of Columbia, presented her views on the current state
of Public Defender Services across the United States.
The tone of the program was both celebratory and reflective, as the
participants praised the legacy of the Gideon decision but cautioned
that much is left to be done in securing adequate legal representation
for the poor. There was great hope among the participants that the
National Equal Justice Library will provide legal scholars and
practitioners with the necessary tools to continue the fight for equal
justice for the disenfranchised. The writings of those who have come
before, attempting to establish programs to help the underprivileged,





DEAN MIaSTEIN: Ladies and gentlemen, all rise for Justice William
Brennan. And now we begin the program. (A film clip from
GIDEON's TRUMPET is shown.)
DEAN MLSTEIN: I am Elliott Milstein, the Dean of the Washington
College of Law of The American University.
On March 18th, 1963, the Supreme Court held that the constitu-
tional right to counsel in criminal cases extended to the poor, and
that states had an obligation to provide counsel in felony cases for
defendants who could not afford to hire one. Today we gather to
celebrate the work of the many people who worked on the Gideon
case, but also the many other lawyers both before and after Gideon
who have spent their time, energy, intellect, and ingenuity continuing
the struggle to provide equal justice. Through their work in public
defender offices, legal aid agencies, legal services programs, clinical
legal education programs, and the pro bono programs of private law
firms, thousands of lawyers have contributed to the effort and today
we salute them.
What a wonderful day for the Washington College of Law and The
American University. We are deeply honored by having attracted to
this occasion so many distinguished guests. If I were to recognize
them all, we would have no time for the program. We have already
noted the presence of Justice Brennan, and we will have another
opportunity to pay him tribute later in the program. I would also like
to acknowledge the presence of President Joseph Duffy/ of The
American University, and many other distinguished guests, many of
whom will be introduced to you later.
We are enormously, enormously proud that we have been named
the Host Institution for the National Equal Justice Library and that
our new building, which we expect to occupy in the Spring of
1995-or some other time-will be the home for this important
resource. The Library, which is a project of the American Bar
Association, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, and the
American Association of Law Libraries, will be an archival collection
of materials dealing with civil and criminal legal aid as it has been
provided by agencies, programs, individual lawyers, and private
lawyers. It will be both a place to study and research, as well as a
museum commemorating those who have worked so selflessly in this
ongoing fight.
It is fitting that this law school was chosen, as its history was written
in the crucible of the fight for equal rights. Our school was founded
by two women in 1896, Ellen Spencer Mussey and Emma Gillette.
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They started a law school to ensure that women as well as men would
have the opportunity to enter the legal profession, and today we carry
on that tradition in our law school in many ways. We have outstand-
ing clinical programs: the Women and the Law Program; the Center
for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law; our teaching, our
scholarship, the pro bono service of our faculty and our students.
The work of our alumni keep this law school deeply committed to
and involved in ensuring that the promise of "Equal Justice for All"
becomes a reality. So on behalf of our president, our provost Milton
Greenberg, my colleagues on the faculty and staff of the law school,
our students, our alumni, I welcome you to the celebration in this
program.
It is now my honor to introduce to you the person who has been
the driving force behind the creation of the National Equal Justice
Library. Justice Earl Johnson, Jr., Associate Justice of the California
Court of Appeal, is one of the towering figures in the legal services
movement. Among the wonderful things he has done in his career,
he was the Deputy Director of the Neighborhood Legal Services
Program in the District of Columbia, where he represented individual
clients in civil matters. In 1965 he was appointed Deputy Director of
the Legal Services Program which was then part of the Office of
Economic Opportunity, and he later the next year became its
Director. During his tenure, the Program grew from just a mere idea
into 850 neighborhood law offices staffed by 2000 lawyers serving 1
million clients a year. Since I and six of my colleagues served in those
programs, we are particularly thankful for his legacy.
Justice Johnson served on the faculty of the University of Southern
California Law School from 1969 to 1982, a time during which he was
a key actor in the movement to establish the Legal Services Corpora-
tion. He has been on the bench since 1982. He has been the prime
mover behind the National EqualJustice Library, served as chair of its
founding committee, and now is president of the Consortium for the
National EqualJustice Library. He is also the first major donor to the
Library, as he and his wife established the Justice Earl Johnson, Jr.,
and BarbaraJohnson Collection of Materials on Legal Representation
of the Poor in Europe and Canada.
Justice Johnson.
Introductory Remarks by Justice Earl Johnson, Jr
JUSTICE JOHNSON: Justice Brennan, Mr. Lewis, honored guests,
ladies and gentlemen: on behalf of the Consortium for the National
Equal Justice Library, I want to welcome you to this program
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commemorating the 30th anniversary of the decision of the Supreme
Court in Gideon v. Wainwright. Just as nothing has been the same in
relations between the races since Brown v. Board of Education was
issued by the Supreme Court in 1954, nothing has been the same in
relations between the poor and the American legal system since
March 18th, 1963. The Gideon opinion focused the nation's attention
on the governmental responsibility to provide legal counsel, and thus
equal justice, to low-income Americans in a way it never had been
before or since.
All of which is to say that in commemorating the Supreme Court's
decision in Gideon v. Wainwright we not only celebrate that decision,
but we also mark the beginning of the most creative two-year period
in the entire history of legal representation of the poor in the United
States. In a sense, Gideon was like a wake-up call that set forces in
motion on a dozen fronts. In a span of time equivalent to that
between today's program and the anticipated opening of the National
Equal Justice Library in early 1995 was created the entire foundation
of our present-day systems of govemment-supplied counsel for the
poor in both criminal and civil cases. In those two years came into
existence the OEO Legal Services Program, the Federal Criminal
Justice Act, the National Defender Project, and literally scores of
public defender and organized offender programs in state courts
around the country.
The idea of the National Equal Justice Library emerged from two
concerns several of us shared. One concern was that we were in
danger of losing much of the history of that creative surge which
followed in the wake of Gideon 30 years ago. We were haunted by
what happened to the vital papers of Claire Shortridge Foltz, the first
woman lawyer in California and the mother of the public defender
movement. She wrote and lobbied through the very first Public
Defender Act in the country, and later promoted similar legislation
in a dozen states. But when she died earlier in this century, all-and
I mean all-of her correspondence and memos and other papers
were thrown out by her heirs who had no appreciation whatsoever of
their historical value. We could see the danger that other private
papers of similar historical importance might be discarded in coming
years as people changed jobs, or moved, or retired-just because
there was no place willing and able to collect and to preserve those
documents. By the way, we were just as worried about losing the
papers of critics and outright opponents of the programs which have
developed as we were about losing the papers of supporters, because
we wanted a complete and accurate history, not a glorification of
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history. And it has been a history of struggle as much as it has been
a history of achievement.
Our other concern was that few of the thousands of lawyers
involved in civil and criminal representation programs were even
aware of the rich heritage of the movements of which they were a
part. We felt a need to instill a knowledge and an appreciation of
that history, and a sense of the inspiring mission they were fulfilling
among those who were laboring day to day on the legal problems of
the poor. Now this was the initial impetus for the library: the
preservation and dissemination of the history of legal representation
of the poor in this country.
However, as planning proceeded, the mission quickly broadened.
We came to realize there was a great need among policy makers in
the field of legal services for a working research library which held
not only historical private papers but which housed under one roof
everything that has been written, studied, planned, or considered in
this field, a place where could be found all the books and articles, all
the legal need studies, all the legislative hearings and reports, all the
Bar Association proposals, and everything else bearing on the
organization, financing, and delivery of legal representation to those
unable to afford their own legal counsel. Moreover, because the
United States is not the only country which has been working on
these problems, and not the only country which has good ideas and
valuable information to contribute, a library where could be found
comprehensive materials on government-funded legal representation
in other nations, as well.
So that became the enlarged dream for what is now the National
EqualJustice Library: a repository of the past, but also a resource for
enriching the present and planning a better future. We approached
the American Bar Association, the Association of American Law
Schools, and the American Association of Law Libraries about their
willingness to participate along with the NLADA in ajoint committee
to establish the as-yet unnamed library. With the help of Bob Raven,
then the immediate past-president of the ABA, and Stan Chaurin, the
president, we managed to gain the approval of the ABA Board of
Governors, along with a small seed grant out of the ABA budget.
We had, as it turned out, another important ally within the ABA.
That was Harriet Ellis, who at that time was a key staff person in the
Association. She was so taken with the idea of the Library, she
personally undertook to write the proposal which was submitted to
the Board of Governors. As many of you know, Harriet Ellis now
serves as the consultant for the National Equal Justice Library. What
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you may not know is that this Gideon program was entirely her idea.
She thought of it, lined up the principal speakers, and put the entire
thing together. I think we all owe her a debt of gratitude for all she
has done to make this day a reality. And that is the reason I would
not let Harriet look at my speech before the session.
Ms. ELLIS: Thank you. It was my privilege and a labor of love.
JUSTICE JOHNSON: Fairly early on in its deliberations, the Joint
Committee decided it would be best if this library could be located in
the Washington-Baltimore area. Among other reasons, we thought it
was important that the library's materials be easily accessible to
national policymakers. So we invited all the law schools in this area
to apply to be the host institution for the library. All expressed real
interest, although some had to bow out because they simply did not
have the space or the ability to expand to accommodate the separate
reading room and other facilities the National Equal Justice Library
will require. Eventually, three law schools submitted detailed written
proposals.
The Joint Committee dispatched a site selection subcommittee
which spent nearly two full days visiting the three schools. They
prepared an exhaustive report which the full Joint Committee pored
over and debated for the better part of a day before deciding on the
Washington College of Law. It was a difficult but nearly unanimous
choice, and I might say, Dean Milstein, one which is looking better
and better as time goes by.
While waiting for American University's new law building to come
into existence, we have found many things to keep us busy. With the
guidance of our pro bono counsel Philip von Mehren of Milbank,
Tweed's Washington office, the Joint Committee organized into a
Washington, D.C. nonprofit corporation called "The Consortium for
the National Equal Justice Library, Inc." We also have begun
collecting materials for the Library. We were especially heartened
when the New York Legal Aid Society informed us that they will be
donating the original records of the nation's first Legal Aid Society
founded in 1876, the German Legal Aid Society, to the National
Equal Justice Library. This German Legal Aid Society became the
New York Legal Aid Society in 1890, which is the reason for the New
York Society possession of the materials. As might be expected, these
records are in German, not English, but you can be assured they will
be well preserved and prominently displayed at the National Equal
Justice Library.
We also recently acquired over twenty-five boxes of materials from
the NLADA, essentially the entire history of that organization, and we
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have also begun collecting materials for our intemational collection
with over 150 volumes already received from the Canadian legal aid
programs. Also of special interest is the Oral History Program we
have started. So far we have conducted almost fifty videotaped
interviews with individuals who have played important roles in the
development of public defender and civil legal services programs.
One of those interviews, by the way, was with the First Lady, Hillary
Rodham Clinton, recounting her years as Chair of the Board of the
Legal Services Corporation.
There was nothing like the National Equal Justice Library around
thirty years ago. As someone who was involved in policymaking in this
field at that time, I sorely wish there had been. I know how much I
gained from reading Reginald Heber Smith's 1919 classic Justice and
the Poor. But frankly that was about all there was available at that
time.
Now we are in a new time, a more difficult time, a more complex
time, a more sophisticated time. Not a time when people speak of
rising expectations as they did in the 1960s, but a time when they
tend to talk only about diminishing resources-or at least that is the
perception. And yet, it is also a time of unrealized goals and
unfulfilled needs and unrighted wrongs. Nowhere is this more true
than in the field of legal representation of those unable to afford
their own counsel. The civil legal services program in this country is
only about half the size it was twelve years ago. Criminal defense is
threatened on all sides and in manyjurisdictions with budget cutbacks
and budget cutoffs and restrictions of all sorts. If in this day and age
you are to realize the ultimate goal of equal justice, fulfill the legal
needs of those unable to afford their own counsel, and right the
many wrongs the legal system currently inflicts on those without
lawyers, you are, I am afraid, going to be required to be smarter,
more knowledgeable, and more sophisticated than was required thirty
years ago.
The National Equal Justice Library, with the knowledge base and
intellectual resources it will supply (which would have been a help,
admittedly, in the mid-1960s) has become, I fear, a necessity in the
mid-1990s. So I ask you to help build that library, and then to use it
well. Thank you.
I would now like to introduce the presidents of the three national
legal organizations which founded the Joint Committee, and now the
Consortium for the National Equal Justice Library. These three
organizations still appoint the core of the Board of the Consortium.
Without the far-sighted leadership of these three organizations who
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could see merit in the idea of the National Equal Justice Library
before it even had that name and was but a gleam in the eye of a half-
dozen individuals, this library would never have happened. And, in
all likelihood, this program honoring Gideon v. Wainwright likewise
would not have been held. So, we owe them a lot.
First from the American Bar Association, its president Michael
McWilliams of Baltimore, Maryland, who is a long-time supporter of
equal justice for all Americans. Then from the Association of Law
Libraries, its president Mark Estes of Denver. Finally, last but
certainly not least, from the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association, its president Lonnie Powers of Boston.
We also have present with us a number of members of the Board
of the Consortium. I am going to ask them to stand and be recog-
nized en masse. FirstJim Milles from the American Association of Law
Libraries. Would you please stand. Jim Neuhard from the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association. Victor Geminiani from the
National Legal Aid and Defender Association. I don't know if
Richard Fishman is here or not. Pat Kehoe, The American University
representative on the Board.
Thank you very much. They put in a lot of hard work, I can tell
you, on this.
Also with us is one of the grand old men of the American Bar
Association. He is probably the mentor to more of the people
involved in legal services and public defender work and generally in
work to help advance the goal of equal justice than almost anyone
alive: Chesterfield Smith from Florida. Chesterfield also was a
president of the American Bar Association more years ago than he
likes to admit.
You will find listed in your program a host of organizations and
entities whose staffs and members have devoted themselves to the goal
of Equal Justice symbolized by Gideon v. Wainwright, and who have
joined with the National EqualJustice Library in commemorating the
30th anniversary of this historic decision. The representatives of these
organizations and entities are all seated in the front few rows here in
front of the podium. I am not going to introduce each one of them,
obviously, but we who are involved in the National Equal Justice
Library welcome their participation in this program and with the
library itself. After all, among them the histories of these organiza-
tions and entities is the national history of the struggle to bring equal
justice to all Americans, and we look forward to receiving their
materials for inclusion in the National Equal Justice Library.
It is now my great pleasure to recognize on behalf of the National
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EqualJustice Library the distinguished Washington law firm of Arnold
& Porter. We honor them not only for the marvelous representation
they provided to Clarence Earl Gideon in the United States Supreme
Court, but for the firm's long tradition of pro bono work on behalf
of low-income Americans both before and after Gideon v. Wainwright.
The library is deeply delighted to thank Arnold & Porter for its
donation of $25,000 to establish the first law firm donated "Named
Collection" within the National Equal Justice Library. When the
library's physical facility is available, the Arnold & Porter collection of
course will be permanently and appropriately recognized on the walls
and within the documents of that library. In the interim, however, we
have prepared a modest plaque which honors both the firm's
commitment to pro bono and its contribution of the Arnold & Porter
collection for the National Equal Justice Library.
Appropriately, we have asked the chair of the firm's pro bono
committee, Brooksley Bom, who also happens to be a member of the
Board of the National EqualJustice Library, to accept this award and,
as well, to speak about the pro bono role of the private bar. It is
appropriate not only because of her present position within the firm
and with the library, but because of Brooksley's own extensive pro
bono efforts over the past quarter century. Among probably a
hundred other things, she helped found the Center for Law and
Social Policy; was instrumental in establishing the Woman's Rights
Project, now the National Women's Law Center; chaired the
Individual Rights and Responsibilities Section of the ABA; was a board
member of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association; and for
the past several years has been a member and continues to be a
member of the ABA Board of Governors.
I am going to ask Brooksley to come forward. I will now attempt
to read the inscription on the plaque: "The Consortium for the
National Equal Justice Library honors the law firm of Arnold &
Porter, pro bono counsel for petitioner Clarence Earl Gideon in
Gideon v. Wainwright, for its long-standing continuing commitment to
public service by lawyers in the cause of Equal Justice for All, and as
the first law firm "Named Collection" donor to the National Equal
Justice Library." The name of that collection is:
"The Arnold & Porter Collection of Historical Materials on
Gideon and other Constitutional Developments affecting the Right
to Counsel in Criminal Cases in Memory of Abe Fortas."
Ms. BORN: Thank you very much.
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Remarks of Brooksley E. Born, Esq.
Thank you very much. Earl, Justice Brennan, and Dean Milstein,
and colleagues and friends: Arnold & Porter is really delighted to
give the first "Named Collection" to the National Equal Justice
Library. The "Named Collection" is being dedicated to the memory
of Abe Fortas. We feel that it is particularly significant to recognize
Abe's contribution to the legal services movement today, the 30th
anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright.
In that case, Abe, through his pro bono representation of an
indigent criminal defendant, established the right to counsel at state
expense for poor criminal defendants. In so doing, he exemplified
his own ideal of the lawyer as public servant. He had served as a
government lawyer in the New Deal Administration of Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, and when he left government service to be one of
the founding partners of Arnold & Porter, he brought to the private
practice of law the same spirit of public service that he had shown as
a government lawyer. He believed that the practice of law was not
merely a commercial venture involving service to paying clients, but
was something more. It was service to the administration of justice
and to the public as a whole.
In founding Arnold & Porter, Abe and his partners made it clear
that there was a pro bono responsibility on the part of all private
practitioners. Early on they established a policy that we still follow
today: that every lawyer in the firm may spend up to 15 percent of
his or her working time doing public service and pro bono legal
services for the poor. Abe recognized that for a society to be
governed by the rule of law, people had to have access to the courts
for redress of their grievances, whether they were rich or poor,
popular or despised. He also recognized, as all lawyers must, that to
have true access to the courts one must have legal representation.
Abe started a firm therefore which represented not only corporations
and wealthy individuals, but also the indigent and the oppressed.
One of our favorite stories at the firm, whether true or apocryphal, is
about a cocktail party in the McCarthy era of the 1950s when another
of our founding partners, Paul Porter, was approached by an irate
person who said, referring to our pro bono program, "I understand
your firm represents communists and rapists." Paul said, "That's
right, we do. What can we do for you?"
Although Abe Fortas and Arnold & Porter had many pro bono
cases in those early days, none so embodied Abe's beliefs about a
lawyer's public service responsibility as Gideon v. Wainwright. By
establishing a right to counsel for indigent criminal defendants, Abe
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obtained recognition that the administration of criminal justice is a
mockery without the legal representation of the defendant, for a
system of justice such as ours which depends on the power of
advocacy cannot operate fairly or well where the advocacy is all on
one side. As Justice Black recognized in his opinion in Gideon:
This noble ideal [of equal justice] cannot be realized if the poor
man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer
to assist him.'
In the Gideon case, Abe Fortas played the noblest role of lawyers.
He was an advocate for his client, and, at the same time, he enhanced
the system ofjustice. Abe Fortas was indeed "Gideon's Trumpet." He
let his golden voice ring forth, and the barriers to justice came down.
The National EqualJustice Library is dedicated to those in the legal
profession like Abe, whether they are private practitioners or legal
services lawyers or public defenders who have worked to fulfill
society's promise of equal justice under law. That job is far from
finished. There is a great deal of work to be done by all of us to
assure access to justice in an era when less than twenty percent of the
poor are obtaining needed civil legal services and when over-crowding
and under-funding of the courts are barriers to access to justice. It
is a time to remember that the vision and dedication and courage of
one lawyer can make an enormous difference in the administration
ofjustice. If each of us can look at the administration ofjustice with
the fresh vision and the fresh view of Abe Fortas and step forward to
do what is necessary to overcome the barriers to justice, what a
difference we can all make. Each of us can be "Gideon's Trumpet"
and bring the barriers down. Thank you.
JUSTICE JOHNSON: Now we come to another very special event on
this program. The last time I stood at a podium with Justice William
Brennan in attendance it was almost twenty-seven years ago: August
1966, at Airlie House Convention Center. My purpose then was to
introduce Justice Brennan as the keynote speaker at the very first
National Conference of the Project Directors of the newly created
OEO Legal Services Program, in essence, the first poverty lawyers in
the country. His speech was an inspiration to the 200-or-more legal
services directors who heard him that night, just as his contributions
on and off the bench have been an inspiration to all of us during the
intervening twenty-seven years.
This afternoon, we are fortunate to have with us a legend to help
us salute a legend. Justice Brennan's good friend, a distinguished
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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actor, a former vice president of the American Judicature Society, a
fellow of the American Bar Foundation, and the man who probably
inspired more young people to become criminal defense attorneys
than anyone alive, the star of what I still think is the best dramatic
series ever produced about the law and lawyers, "The Defenders." Of
course I refer to E.G. Marshall.
Salute to Justice William J Brennan, Jr., for His Many Contributions to the
Goal of Equal Justice for All
By E.G. Marshall
E.G. MARSHALL: At the time that Gideon was first published, I
exclaimed, '"ow!" I wrote to Abe Fortas asking him what turned the
Court away from Betts v. Brady? Hugo Black wrote the dissent in that
opinion, denying the right of counsel. Hugo Black wrote, of course
as you know, Gideon. I asked Mr. Fortas how we could make this more
known to the public. Could I help in any way? Also, what turned the
tide on it? "Well," he said, "Anthony Lewis is writing a very good
book, Gideon's Trumpet," and I said, "Wonderful." And Henry Fonda
did a wonderful job as Gideon. So something was accomplished.
That August at a prayer breakfast, I sat at the head table with a man
who has become a very dear friend of mine, William Joseph Brennan,
Jr., and his dear wife, vivacious Mary Brennan. "I am in love with a
man I never met," was the headline of a column, not in one of those
supermarket tabloids-but in The New York Times by that marvelous
writer Anna Quindlan, a page-mate of Mr. Lewis'-although, they
never meet. Mr. Lewis is on Monday and Friday, and Anna is on
Sunday and Wednesday. But that is one of the most notable things
about Justice Brennan: love.
I was riffling through some of my old textbooks to find a quote to
the effect that law is not written; law is not made; it is discovered. It
just takes a clear eye, a keen mind, and a strong heart to bring it to
the light of day. It was always there. We just couldn't see it until men
like Justice Fortas andJustice Brennan andJustice Black came along.
And now with this library, scholars, students, lawyers, judges,
legislators, teachers, will be able to "access" the "discoveries" of the
past and "input" the recent ones. All from one comprehensive
source. This will save a lot of time. No more climbing through
shelves. The National Equal Justice Library will be an important
national resource.
I would like to quote from Laurence Tribe to make sure that
I am saying something authentic and sensible: "What makes Justice
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Brennan's accomplishments so remarkable and so timeless is that they
created not a mere sandcastle to be washed away by the political
vicissitudes of the Court's ebb and flow, but a well-founded legal
edifice that will withstand constitutional tides for decades to come."2
My heart is filled with joy at this opportunity to join you in saluting
one of the great Justices of our era, and with this blessing:
May the road rise up to meet you.
May the wind be always at your back.
May the sun warm your face,
And the rain fall gentle on your land.
And until we meet again,
May you rest in the palm of God's hand.
And I hope we are both here in 1995 for the opening, the ribbon-
cutting ceremony.
Now I would like to read this plaque, if I may:
For his many contributions to the goal of Equal Justice for All, as
a member of the United States Supreme Court and as an intellectu-
al and moral leader of this Nation, to be commemorated in the
National EqualJustice Library a resource for the study and advance-
ment of legal representation of the poor.
(E.G. Marshall presents the plaque to Justice Brennan.)
DEAN MUSTEIN: What a day! What I was going to say to our
students is that you have heard biographies of some very distinguished
lawyers, and I wanted to point out to you that each of them at some
point started as a law student. But perhaps the most famous of them
all, E.G. Marshall, never did. So there is a lesson there.
Our keynote speaker today is the distinguished journalist and
columnist for The New York Times, Anthony Lewis. Mr. Lewis joined
the Washington Bureau of the Times in 1955 to cover the Supreme
Court, the Justice Department, and other legal matters. Among other
things, he reported on the Warren Court and on the Federal
Government's response to the civil rights movement. He won his
second Pulitzer Prize in 1963 for his coverage of the Supreme Court.
He was a Niemann Fellow and studied law at Harvard Law School and
was for 15 years a lecturer at the Harvard Law School teaching a
course on the Constitution and the press.
He is the author of three books. Most recently, Make No Law: The
Sullivan Case and the First Amendment. His second book, Portrait of a
Decade, was about the great changes in American race relations.
Today, however, we are most interested in his wonderful book, I guess
2. Laurence Tribe, Architect of the Bill of Rights, A.B.A.J., Feb. 1991, at 47, 47.
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his first book, Gideon's Trumpet, which I am sure most of you have




ANTHONY LEWIS: Dean Milstein, thank you. Justice Johnson, Ms.
Born, Justice Brennan, ladies and gentlemen: What could be more
moving than to celebrate the Gideon case today in the presence of
Justice Brennan, the man who more than any other has given
meaning to the theme of equality in our Constitution? Before saying
a word about Gideon, I want to go back to a time that Ms. Born
actually mentioned to my surprise and pleasure, the McCarthy period,
the 1950s, when American society was afflicted by a great fear, the
fear of communism. There was hysteria about security risks in
government, about disloyal motormen on the New York subways,
about supposed communists on The New York Times. People were
driven from theirjobs. Pilloried. Persecuted because someone said
they were soft on communism.
I was a young reporter in Washington then on a paper that no
longer exists but that deserves a plug-The Washington Daily
News-and I wanted to find out what was happening. I sought out
some of the victims of the security mania and found them through
their lawyers. One lawyer who was of great help to me was a single
practitioner, a friend and honored friend, Joseph A. Fanelli. One of
the first firms I went to was Arnold, Fortas & Porter, as it was then.
It had represented a young woman named Dorothy Bailey who lost
her job in the federal civil service because someone said she was a
security risk. Who the "someone" was, or exactly what the "someone"
said, Ms. Bailey did not know because the system kept that informa-
tion from her. Arnold, Fortas & Porter challenged that system as a
denial of due process. They lost in the U.S. Court of Appeals here by
a 2-1 vote in a divided panel. They took the case, Bailey v. Richardson,
to the Supreme Court where the judgment was affirmed by an equally
divided Court. The firm did all that without charging Ms. Bailey
because the lawyers thought it was their duty to help challenge a
system so unjust and so subversive of good government. When it was
all over and they had lost, Dorothy Bailey was hired by Arnold, Fortas
& Porter.
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There were not many happy endings in that "scoundrel time"3 for
the victims of the Great Fear, but there would have been none-and
there were some-without lawyers who were willing to take on difficult
cases without hope of financial reward-indeed, at great potential
personal cost. And by "cost," I mean both financial burden and the
possibility, the very real possibility, rather implied in Ms. Born's nice
story of Paul Porter's response, that lawyers who represented security
risks, supposed security risks, would themselves be denounced as
apologists for communism.
Ladies and gentlemen, the profession of law-perhaps it is
necessary for some cold light here today-is not always so noble. The
characteristic lawyer probably spends most of his or her days advising
corporate clients, or carrying on some other activity that does not
bring to mind a movie starring Katherine Hepburn and Spencer
Tracy. But I am convinced that law is the critical profession in the
American system, the one that from the beginning has breathed life
into our constitutional promise of ordered freedom. In particular,
lawyers have had the responsibility of trying to keep the promise that
in this society the least powerful among us, the despised and rejected,
will have the right to justice.
That was, of course, what the Gideon case was about. Clarence Earl
Gideon was at the bottom of the pyramid of power in this country, an
habitual petty criminal, penniless, worn out beyond his years; but
when he made the claim that he could not get justice as a criminal
defendant without the guiding hand of a lawyer, the Supreme Court
of the United States decided in his favor. The right to counsel now
is like motherhood, universally revered. Even as other rights of
criminal defendants established at about the same time, 1963, as the
Gideon case, even as those other rights are eroded by the current
Supreme Court, the Court pays homage to the Gideon decision and
says that it is fundamental and for keeps. But I wonder how much we
really understand and accept the principle when we get below the
abstraction, the generality? I will intrude here a personal story.
You have seen on the screen a little bit the beginning of the
representation of Gideon's first trial for breaking and entering the
Bay Harbor Pool Room in Panama City, Florida, the trial at which he
was not represented by counsel. I attended the second trial, after he
won his case in the Supreme Court, when he was entitled to a lawyer
and he had a lawyer, one he chose himself, having rejected the kind
3. SegeneraIly LILLIAN HELLMAN, SCOUNDREL TIME (1976) (discussing communist hunting
and blacklisting in 1950s).
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offer of the American Civil Liberties Union to represent him. He was
rather cantankerous, that Mr. Gideon. Then I watched this film being
made. I had nothing to do with it, but the person who had written
the script, was really the spirit of the film, David Rintels, asked me to
come out and watch it being shot, and I did. They shot the scene of
the second trial in a small courtroom south of Los Angeles.
Now in the first trial a taxi driver had been called by the prosecu-
tion, and he testified that he had picked Gideon up-that Gideon
had telephoned him and asked him to come to be picked up at about
two o'clock in the morning on the comer of the street just outside
the Bay Harbor Pool Room which had been burgled.
The prosecutor asked the taxi driver, "Did Mr. Gideon say anything
when he got in the cab?"
The taxi driver said: "Yes, he said, 'Don't tell anybody you picked
me up.'"
The prosecutor said, "Thank you very much. That's all."
And the judge said, "Mr. Gideon, would you care to cross-examine"?
Well, as you know, he had no questions.
Here I was now in this old courtroom south of Los Angeles
watching the second trial at which the lawyer who was appointed at
Gideon's request to represent him, Fred Turner, was played by a
young and a very able character actor named Lane Smith. The taxi
driver was called by the prosecutor again, and he testified again that
he picked Gideon up and Gideon had said, "Don't tell anybody you
picked up me." And Lane Smith, playing Fred Tumer-I had really
forgotten all this; I actually watched the second trial, but I had
forgotten it-Lane Turner said, "Had he ever said that to you
before?"
And the taxi driver said: "Oh, yes. He said that to me every time
I picked him up."
"Why?"
The taxi driver said: "I think it was some kind of woman trouble."
And Lane Smith, making this part up, walked over to the jury with
a broad wink and said, "Well, we all know about that."
And the director said, "Cut."
And I turned to the person next to me and I said, "My God, it
really makes a difference to have a lawyer, doesn't it?"
In a more serious sense, far more serious, we as a society I think
have not fully understood and put into practice the true meaning of
the Gideon decision. When I wrote Gideon's Trumpet thirty years ago,
I was naive about the promise of equal justice. I assumed that our
political system would vindicate the rights established in Gideon v.
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Wainwright, but we are far from doing that, in my judgment.
Early this year The American Lawyer devoted an issue to portraying
the reality of the justice we give to many indigent defendants in this
country-and that is most criminal defendants, ladies and gentlemen,
upwards of seventy percent. In Indianapolis, to take just one
example, Bobby Houston was held injail for nineteen months without
ever being tried on the charge brought against him, child molesting.
Four of those months were after the charge had been dismissed.
Why? The public defender handling the case never told him about
the dismissal, and never told the prison authorities. Nor would the
lawyer accept collect calls from the prisoner about his case, for the
understandable reason that public defenders in Indianapolis are given
almost nothing for office expenses and routinely therefore reject
collect calls.
That is one example of limitless ones in this country today.
Inadequacies of counsel add up to a lot of skimped justice. I think
the worst blot on the legal record is the quality of lawyers in capital
cases. Too often, the quality is simply dismal. At the trial of
defendants facing the death penalty, lawyers have been drunk, asleep,
indifferent, grotesquely inexperienced. Later, on appeal or federal
habeas corpus, volunteer lawyers come in to try to rescue convicted
defendants, and they are frequently shocked at what they find in the
record: that trial counsel did not do even a passable job. And of
course by then it is really too late to correct that record.
The constitutional guarantee is of "competent counsel," but the
contemporary Supreme Court has given that adjective so little
meaning that it might just as well be omitted. Those who have tried
unsuccessfully to litigate the issue of competence of counsel speak of
the "spoon test." If you hold a spoon up to a lawyer's mouth, a
defense lawyer's mouth, and it shows he is breathing, he is competent.
Moreover, as this audience will well know, a majority of the Court has
for some years been carrying out an agenda to restrict-indeed, all
but eliminate-the last hope of capital defendants to vindicate their
rights: federal habeas corpus.
The judges who handle those cases, the district judges, federal
districtjudges, are reluctant to upset the decisions of state courts. But
an American Bar Association study showed that they have done so in
forty percent of capital cases that come to them, a grim testament to
the reality that many men and women have been convicted and
sentenced to death at trials at which they were represented by lawyers
who lacked the needed skill and dedication, or lacked the needed
resources which are often denied by state assistance. We have had a
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dramatic reminder lately of how capital cases can go wrong. I am
sure most of you saw the story.
Walter McMillian, a black man from Monroeville, Alabama, was
accused of murdering a white woman. Monroeville happened to be
the home of Harper Lee, but the real-life story was not like the
triumph of justice over racism in Lee's novel To Kill a Mockingbird.
Immediately after his arrest-before trial-McMillian was sent to
Alabama's death row. At trial a dozen witnesses testified that he was
home on the day of the murder, and there was no physical evidence
against him. The jury nevertheless found him guilty-but it sen-
tenced him to life imprisonment. The judge, as Alabama law entitled
him to do, changed the sentence to death. His lawyers tried five
times by different means to save him. Much evidence of improper
police and prosecution behavior was found. Sixty Minutes told the
story. Finally, two or three weeks ago, prosecutors joined in asking
for his release, and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals threw out
McMillian's conviction. When a reporter asked McMillian whether
the decision restored his faith in the system, he had the courage to
answer, "No, not at all."
It is lawyers who have the burden of maintaining faith in our system
of justice, but then I do not think that should be viewed as a
"burden." It is a privilege: an honor that gives meaning to their
professional life. In celebrating the Gideon case, we should not forget
the part that lawyers played in it. The briefs and arguments were
exceptional, a testimonial to what the profession can do. We have
here today Abe Krash and John Hart Ely, who assisted Abe Fortas in
the representation of Clarence Earl Gideon before the Supreme
Court and in the scholarly expounding of the right to counsel as a
principle. We have BruceJacob, who represented the State of Florida
with honor and distinction. And we should not forget the lawyers
who extraordinarily persuaded twenty-three states to ask the Supreme
Court in a brief amicus to require counsel for indigent criminal
defendants. They included the Attorney General of Massachusetts,
Edward McCormack, and his assistant, Gerald Berlin, and the
Attorney General of Minnesota, Walter F. Mondale.
But we should be thinking today about more than the rights of
criminal defendants, even though that is the reason for our being
here. Lawyers have a great part to play, too, in assuring other kinds
of justice. I think of the lawyers who defended witnesses before
communist-hunting congressional committees and represented so-
called "security risks"; of lawyers who represent the poor in civil cases
today under the out-manned, out-gunned Legal Services Corporation.
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I think of the Yale students and their Professor, Harold Koh who have
fought so hard in the last year against the Bush administration and
despite promises of the Clinton administration to establish that
Haitians have a right to make a case for political asylum before being
sent back to the murderous regime in Haiti. Ladies and gentlemen,
whatJustice Holmes said early in this century is just as true today: "It
is possible to live greatly in the law."
Now I was going to stop there, but it seemed to me that on this
occasion I might say another word about the person who really
brought us here: Clarence Earl Gideon. I am often asked, "What
ever happened to him? Did he go back to a life of crime? Was he
ever in trouble again?" The answer is that, so far as I know, and I
think I do know, he only ever got in trouble one more time. He went
to the Kentucky Derby, and he didn't win. He was across the river in
one of those Ohio River towns, and he was arrested for vagrancy. He
was called before the judge or the magistrate.
"How do you plead, Mr. Gideon?"
"Well, before we have this case, Your Honor, I wonder if you'd have
a look at this?" And he hands him a copy of my book.
"Now," the judge said, "it is very interesting. I don't have time to
read it right now, but you spend the night in the lockup and I'll see
you tomorrow, Mr. Gideon."
The next day he comes into court. The judge says, 'Well, Mr.
Gideon, I've read the book, and I must say I'm delighted and
honored to have met you. It is wonderful to know you are right here
in my courtroom. Actually, I was just going to let you go. But if I
understand the case correctly, it only holds that people charged with
'serious' crimes are entitled to free counsel if they're poor. But if you
would like to see whether the Supreme Court would extend that to
petty crimes like this one-instead of letting you go, I will sentence
you to six months in jail and you can take it on up."
"Well, if it's all the same to you, Judge...."
That is the last thing I heard about Clarence Earl Gideon until,
while I lived in London in 1972, I received a letter from Abe Fortas
that contained a funeral notice from Hannibal, Missouri. The funeral
notice was for the death and burial of Clarence Earl Gideon. I knew
nothing but that, and I knew no one to telephone but the funeral
parlor. So from London I telephoned the funeral parlor in Hannibal
and spoke to the owner, who told me the name, the address, the
phone number of Gideon's mother, who was still alive. I was about
to hang up when he said-and forgive the reminiscing, but it is in my
mind-when he said, "Did you know that Hannibal, Missouri, was the
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birthplace of Mark Twain?" I said, "Yes, I do."
Then I hung up and called Gideon's mother. I introduced myself.
I just gave my name and she said, "You're the fellow who wrote that
terrible book!"
I said, "What do you mean?"
She said, "Well, you said those terrible things about my second
husband, and said he was cruel to Clarence, and that wasn't true.
Those were lies."
I said, "Well, Mrs.'-I don't remember her name-but "Mrs. Jones,
actually I didn't say those things; Clarence said those things. I just
quoted his letter. I printed it in full."
She said, "Well, it wasn't right. You shouldn't have printed it!"
And, you know, it shows you that there is another view.
But anyway, at the end of the conversation she said, "If he'd gone
to school as he ought to and behaved himself, Clarence could have
been most anything." And I said, "But he was something." And he
was.
DEAN MILSTEIN: Thank you for the reminder again that the law is
about people and about clients.
We now move to our panel discussion. I would like to introduce
Professor Richard Wilson, the Director of our International Human
Rights Clinic, who will be the moderator of the panel. Professor
Wilson has been a public defender in Illinois. He was the Director of
the Defender Division of the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association, a Professor at the CUNY Law School in New York, and
since 1989 a member of our clinical faculty. Professor Wilson will
moderate the panel and introduce the other panelists.
Recollections, Viewpoints, and Discussion About Right to Counsel Before
and Thirty Years After Gideon v. Wainwright
PROFESSOR WILSON: Justice Brennan, other honored guests: It is
an incredible privilege for me to be here this afternoon to speak to
all of you about my own experience as a public defender and to
introduce several people who played a role in the Gideon decision, and
the director of a public defender office who will speak of her own
experiences as a public defender. I made the decision to begin work
as a public defender in my third year of law school. I was a clerk in
a public defender office in southern Illinois and had the great good
fortune and luck of briefing and arguing five criminal appeals, in all
of which I was successful in obtaining a reversal of the defendant's
conviction, or a significant reduction in that defendant's sentence.
It confirmed my decision that public defense was my chosen career.
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I believed that my choice to become a public defender lived up to the
highest moral aspirations of the legal profession.
However, I found quickly as a new public defender that the first
question I was asked was often, "How can you represent somebody
you know is guilty?" At first I thought the question was strange and
somehow had some underlying prejudice. I had never heard, for
example, of a doctor who had mended the wounds of a poor patient
with gunshot wounds from a bar fight and was asked, "How can you
treat someone you know is guilty?" I had never heard anyone ask a
psychologist who provided therapy to a poor person whose psychoses
may have led to violent behavior, "How can you counsel someone you
know is guilty?"
Later, through my 13-year career as a public defender, at every
cocktail party at which I was asked that question I adapted my answers
to fit my mood. I said, "I enjoy working with underdogs"; "I am
fascinated by the causes of aberrant human behavior"; "I distrust all
authority, especially that of the government"; "I have a masochistic
desire to lose" (and I did, frequently); "Someone has to do it"; and,
"My clients themselves are the victims of social injustice."
However, in thinking about my remarks today, I believe that at
bottom, myself and others who have dedicated their lives to careers
as public defenders do so because it is a way for me and for my
profession to recognize and honor the dignity and worth of every
person who is hauled before a court of law. That notion, unfortu-
nately, is not universal. In my work more recently with international
human rights, I have become aware that the commitment we have in
this country to public defense services is truly exceptional. Very few
governments in the world provide state subsidized defense services for
the indigent accused at all, let alone the nearly $1.7 billion it is
estimated that we spend now at the federal, state, and local levels on
the provision of defense services throughout this country.
Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Gideon provides an
international perspective. He said, "The right of one charged with
crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to a
fair trial in some countries, but it is in ours."4 In some countries,
representation of the unpopular and poor defendants can get you
killed. Two examples from an all-too-long list will suffice. In 1989,
Patrick Finucane, a Belfast solicitor active in criminal defense for ten
years, was shot dead in front of his family by three men claiming
affiliation with the Ulster Freedom Fighters, a local paramilitary
4. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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group. In that same year, Tao So Lung, a young lawyer and officer
with the Singapore Law Society, was placed in solitary confinement in
Singapore under the Internal Security Act for her defense of criminals
accused in political trials. She remains in solitary confinement today.
While lawyers here seldom risk their lives, it is remarkable, I think,
that only within most of our lifetimes the right to counsel has
achieved full constitutional vindication. Several of the lawyers who
were involved in the litigation leading to definitive constitutional
protection of the right to counsel in criminal cases are here today.
The first to speak to us will be Abe Krash. Mr. Krash, educated at the
University of Chicago, has been with the law firm of Arnold & Porter
since 1953. As a young partner in that firm, he joined Abe Fortas on
the brief before the U.S. Supreme Court. He is now a senior partner
at Arnold & Porter. Abe Krash.
Remarks of Abe Krash, Esq.
ABE KRASH: Thank you. Justice Brennan, Mary, honored guests:
The two architects of the Gideon decision were Abe Fortas, a brilliant
advocate, and Hugo Black, a great judge. Each of them was a
remarkable man. It seems to me appropriate on this occasion, when
we celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the Gideon decision, to take
a few moments to remember them and to speak of the contributions
that each of them made to this landmark decision.
Measured by any standard, the man appointed by the Supreme
Court to represent Clarence Earl Gideon, Abe Fortas, was one of the
best lawyers of his generation. He was a superlative legal craftsman.
He was an artist in the law. Fortas had been a lawyer in the govern-
ment during the New Deal and World War II. He had worked
together with Jerome Frank in the Agricultural Administration; at the
Securities and Exchange Commission with William 0. Douglas; and
at the Department of Interior with Harold Ickes. At the age of 32, he
was appointed Under Secretary of Interior. Fortas became justly
renowned during the Roosevelt years as one of the outstanding
lawyers in the government.
After World War II, he formed a private law firm together with
Thurman Arnold and Paul Porter. In private practice, Fortas advised
clients with antitrust and securities problems and in matters involving
federal administrative agencies and Congress. He was not a specialist
in the criminal law. Yet, as a lawyer and as a judge he was to play a
major role in three of the most important decisions in the criminal
law during the past half-century.
In 1953, he was appointed by the United States Court of Appeals
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for the District of Columbia Circuit to represent the appellant in a
case called Durham v. United States. He urged the Court of Appeals in
that case to abandon a test of criminal responsibility that had been
adopted in England over a century ago, to take account of develop-
ments in psychiatry, to allow psychiatrists to participate in a meaning-
ful way in a criminal trial, and to reform the insanity defense in
criminal cases. In the Durham case, the Court of Appeals established
a new standard of criminal responsibility, and it ignited the debate
concerning that issue which has continued to this day.
In 1967, when Abe Fortas was aJustice on the Supreme Court, he
wrote the opinion of the Court in the Gault case, a significant
decision involving the rights of juveniles. And, as Clarence Earl
Gideon's advocate in the Supreme Court he played a key role in that
case. The Durham case, Gault, and the Gideon case all bear the
unmistakable imprint of Abe Fortas.
Shortly after he was appointed by the Supreme Court to represent
Gideon, Fortas asked me to assist him. It was a command perfor-
mance. I was aided by an associate in our firm, Ralph Temple, and
byJohn Ely who was a third-year student at the Yale Law School and
was spending his summer at our firm. Ralph Temple went on to
become a prominent civil liberties lawyer, andJohn is now, I think it
fair to say, one of the country's most distinguished constitutional law
scholars.
The task, which Fortas set for himself as an advocate in the Gideon
case, was to convince the Supreme Court to rule that every person in
this country accused of a serious crime is entitled to a lawyer, whether
the prosecution is in a federal or a state court. Moreover, Fortas
wanted to persuade all nine of the Justices to endorse that principle.
One of the first questions he put to us when he summoned us
together to consider how we were going to write the brief was this:
How do we convince the Supreme Court that a ruling requiring the
appointment of counsel in all criminal cases would not be a radical
step?
The Supreme Court had decided in 1938 that the Sixth Amend-
ment required that a lawyer be furnished to the defendant in every
federal criminal prosecution. The Court had also ruled that an
accused person was entitled to counsel in every state criminal case
involving the death penalty. But the court had refused to extend that
requirement to prosecutions in the state courts for noncapital crimes,
even serious felonies. The Court had ruled in 1942 in Betts v. Brady
that the states were required to furnish a lawyer to an indigent
defendant only if the case involved special circumstances such as a
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youthful or mentally ill defendant. That was the law at the time of
the Gideon case.
We ascertained that the great majority of the states had already
made provision by 1962 for the appointment of counsel in all felony
cases, either expressly or as a matter of practice. There were only five
states at that time-Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, and
South Carolina-that did not provide for the appointment of counsel
in behalf of indigent defendants in all felony cases. It followed,
therefore, that a decision by the Supreme Court that the Fourteenth
Amendment required the appointment of a lawyer by the states in all
criminal cases would not be a revolutionary step.
The second issue that Fortas felt he needed to address was a more
troublesome question. It was the issue of federalism. The precise
issue presented by the Gideon case was whether the states were obliged
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to provide
counsel to an accused person in all felony cases. At that time-I am
speaking of the 1960s-there was a great ongoing debate within the
Supreme Court concerning the application of the Bill of Rights to the
states under the Fourteenth Amendment. The first Ten Amendments
to the Constitution apply to the Federal Government. The issue was
whether, pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, all of the Bill of Rights, or only some of them, also
limited state power.
The challenge confronting Abe Fortas was to convince thoseJustices
who were reluctant to expand the scope of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to rule that the Due Process Clause required the states to
provide a lawyer to a defendant in every felony case, and not only in
a case involving special circumstances. The insight that Fortas had on
this problem of federalism can be expressed this way: the special
circumstances test was a doctrine that should be rejected even by
those Justices who were sensitive to States' rights and who were
reluctant to expand the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Fortas pointed out that in nearly every case involving conviction in
a state court where the defendant had not been represented by a
lawyer, a habeas corpus petition would be presented to a federal
judge by the convicted person seeking review of the state court's
judgment as a denial of due process. What could be more of an
irritant to state court judges, Fortas asked, than to have a federal
judge review their decisions under a vague standard on a case-by-case
basis?
In the brief he submitted to the Supreme Court, Fortas' argument
was essentially simple. An accused person cannot effectively defend
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himself without a lawyer. The defendant cannot properly evaluate the
legality of his arrest. He cannot determine the validity of the
indictment, or whether a search and seizure has been lawful, or
whether a confession is admissible. He cannot determine whether he
is responsible for the crime, or for a lesser offense. At the trial, the
defendant is not equipped or qualified to make objections to
evidence. He is unable to act as a lawyer would in the sentencing
process. In short, the assistance of a lawyer is essential to a fair trial
and, accordingly, it is required by due process of law. It was an
elegant brief.
In his memoirs, Justice Douglas wrote that Abe Fortas' oral
argument in the Supreme Court in the Gideon case was probably the
best single argument that Douglas heard in all of his thirty-six years
on the Supreme Court. To me, Abe Fortas is a tragic figure, but his
extraordinary brief and argument in the Gideon case are models of the
art of advocacy, and his great contribution to the Gideon case should
be remembered, and it should be honored, as among the finest hours
of the bar in recent times.
It must have been a wonderful moment for Hugo Black when he
delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court in the Gideon case on the
morning of March 18th, 1963. Twenty-one years earlier, Justice Black
had dissented, together with Justice Douglas and Justice Murphy,
when the Supreme Court had ruled in the Betts case by a vote of six
to three that the states were not required by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to provide counsel to indigent defendants in all cases. Justice
Black believed passionately in the Bill of Rights. He was a fighter, and
he battled tenaciously and with a singleness of purpose for two
decades to convince the Court to extend to the states each of the
rights and liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. And now, he was
the spokesman for a unanimous Court holding that the right to
counsel, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, is a fundamental right
essential to a fair trial and is made obligatory upon the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment. I say, what a wonderful moment it must
have been for Hugo Black!
There are two separate themes in Black's great opinion in Gideon.
There is the concept of fair trial and due process of law, and there is
the idea of equality of justice for all persons regardless of economic
circumstances. First of all, Black's opinion reflects the view that in
our adversary system ofjustice an individual needs a lawyer to prepare
and to present his defense. Hugo Black knew from personal
experience how important it is to have a lawyer at your side in the
courtroom. He had been a county prosecutor, a police court judge,
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and a practicing lawyer in Birmingham, Alabama, a tough and violent
steel town in the early years of the century. He had defended Afro-
Americans who were detained in the city jail longer than their
sentences required. And when he was the prosecutor for Jefferson
County, he fought against third-degree measures used by the police
to extract confessions. As he stated in the Gideon opinion, "Reason
and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system,
a[] person ... cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him."5
The second theme in the Gideon opinion reflects Justice Black's
profound empathy for those who are poor and disadvantaged. Black
had vivid memories of the pervasive poverty and of the racism he had
experienced when he was growing up in Clay County. As a lawyer, he
had represented coal miners in the first strike in the State of
Alabama. And as a prosecutor, he attacked unfair settlements made
with injured workers by insurance companies. When he ran for the
Senate in 1926, Black's campaign slogan was, "I am not now and have
never been a railroad, power company, or a corporation lawyer." It
was simply unacceptable to Hugo Black that a man should be denied
a fair trial because he was poor. For Justice Black, a lawyer in a
criminal case was a necessity, not a luxury.
Of all the men and women in public life in Washington in my four
decades in this city, I count Hugo Black as one of the most admirable,
and I regard the Gideon decision as one of his greatest legacies to our
generation and to future generations of Americans.
Before concluding, I would just like to say one word about the
enduring significance of the Gideon case. It is true, regrettably it is
true, that the high hopes we had in 1963 have not been fulfilled.
Much remains to be done if the right to counsel is to be meaningful.
However, I think it is significant that the Gideon decision has been
immune from attack even by the most severe critics of the Warren
Court. Some critics have urged the Supreme Court to limit or to
overrule various decisions of the 1950s and the 1960s with respect to
the rights of accused persons, but no responsible voice-no responsi-
ble voice-is heard today urging that the Gideon decision should be
overruled. Even the most severe critics of the Warren Court do not
say today we should abandon the ruling of the Gideon test case. The
right to counsel in a criminal prosecution is accepted as a fundamen-
tal right. The Gideon case stands, I suggest, as a landmark in
American constitutional law because it affirms a principle that is basic
5. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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in a free and just society. Thank you.
PROFESSOR WILSON: Thank you, Mr. Krash. Professor John Hart
Ely was a second-year law clerk at Arnold & Porter when he under-
took the task of preparation of background memoranda and research
in support of the work of that firm in Gideon v. Wainwright. Since that
time, he graduated from law school, clerked with Chief Justice Earl
Warren, became a public defender in San Diego in both the state and
federal courts, and later served as General Counsel in the Department
of Transportation in the Ford administration.
He has been a law teacher at the law schools at Yale, Harvard, and
Stanford, and served as the Dean at Stanford Law School from 1982
through 1987. He is a visiting Professor of Law at the University of
Virginia this year. He has authored two books, Democracy and Distrust
in 1980, a winner of the Order of the Coif Award, and a forthcoming
book, War and Responsibility, which will be released later this year.
Professor John Hart Ely.
Remarks of Professor John Hart Ely
PROFESSOR ELY: A lot of nice things have happened here this
afternoon, and I think one of them is that the name of Abe Fortas
has been uttered without embarrassment and even with praise. I am
delighted that the firm that no longer bears his name saw fit to make
the gift in his honor. Whatever mistakes he made-and he plainly
made some-he did not deserve the ignominious end he had, and he
did a lot of great things. (Of course he didn't do them alone. If I
am not mistaken, Abe Krash was also on the Durham brief with him.
[Krash indicates yes.] And I am sure you would have been on the
Gault case if you were not a little old to be a law clerk at that point.)
[Laughter].
It is not necessary to reminisce about what happened here. That
would be superfluous given Tony's excellent book and the movie
based on it. The book is called Gideon's Trumpet, of course. I've been
a law teacher most of my career, as you heard, and the book has
caused me a lot of trouble because endless law students come into my
office and say, "I don't want to go the usual route this summer. I
want ajob like you had." [Laughter].
I say, "Well, that may not be replicable."
Actually, I went to the firm knowing that it had this case, and even
had bargained to get to work on it before I went there. Why a firm
full of associates agreed to let a summer clerk work on this case so
centrally I don't know, but I'm sure they knew what they were doing.
[Laughter]. And besides, those guys are all rich now, so who cares?
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So they didn't get to work on Gideon, but they could buy and sell me.
[Laughter].
Well, anyway, students come in and say, "Let's figure out what's the
next Gideon v. Wainwright. I am going to angle for thisjob. We've got
to figure this out." [Laughter].
Then I say, "They paid me $75 a week."
Then the student says, "I'll get back to you on this idea." [Laugh-
ter].
I also learned something from the movie. I got, as I guess we all
did, a script for my approval. This must have been so we wouldn't
sue them. I read through it. It has two sickening scenes.
In one I appear and say, "Oh, Mr. Fortas, congratulations! You are
a role model, a hero, you're everything I've ever wanted to be. If I
could be like you, I would grow up to be a happy man," or something
along those lines, which doesn't sound exactly the way I usually talk.
And my other scene was, sitting at the Supreme Court argument, I
turn to Abe Krash and say, or whisper, "Now just who is it that's on
the other side in this case?" This is months after working on it.
[Laughter]. So there I am, an obsequious and retarded law student.
But in the script there was also this wonderful scene which
replicated a memo I actually did send to Abe Krash and Abe Fortas
saying that if Gideon had had a lawyer, here are the various things he
could have done. And it had the actor playing me acting out the
possible trial, and it was a lengthy and wonderful scene. And I said,
okay, I will agree to the package because that scene is in there. I
don't like this other stuff, but I'll go for the package.
Well, you can probably figure out what happened. [Laughter].
Two of those three scenes are in the movie. [Laughter]. I can't even
tell you who played my part. The credits at the end of the movie
listed a number of people. It said, "The part of Ralph Temple was
played by X; the part of James Fitzpatrick-these were associates in
the firm-was played by Y," but nothing about John Ely.
So I went up to Tony's friend, Mr. Rentelle, at the showing at
Harvard and I said, "How come it didn't say the part of John Ely was
played by" so and so. I didn't see my name there.
He said, "Oh, the guy who played you was up at the beginning
without a special billing because you were one of the main charac-
ters."
I said, "I had two lines."
He said, 'Well, before the cuts were made, you had one of the main
parts." [Laughter].
It has become mildly fashionable-we heard the beginnings of it
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today-to say that this is a case that hasn't panned out. I want to
dissent from that, somewhat. I have got here a column from The
Washington Post for January 23rd of this year written by Nat Hentoff,
called "A Disgrace to the Law." It is about the anniversary of Gideon
v. Wainwright, and the gravamen is-I use that word for you law
students-the gravamen of the column is that Gideon hasn't worked.
Hentoff's central exhibit is that the percentage of defendants
represented by public defenders has gone up markedly over the last
ten years. I would like to suggest that that is not an element of proof
that anything is going wrong.
You will hear from Ms. Davis, and I will be interested to hear what
she has to say, if she wants to address this, but remember to the
extent she is describing her office as bleak, she does have a budget
that she has to defend and augment. I, however, wish to defend the
proposition that by and large public defender's offices (emphatically
including hers) are pretty darn good.
As was said, after law school and after I clerked and so forth, I did
go to work as a public defender in San Diego. There were maybe
two, three, four, five people-and this is a city of about a million
people-lawyers in town that were better than we were, a handful.
Then there were us. Then was everyone else in terms of ability to
represent people. The "everyone else" subdivided into two categories:
people who really needed the work and couldn't get it anyway else,
who just hung around waiting to be appointed; and corporate lawyers
who were smart but didn't know what they were doing in a criminal
courtroom.
Now occasionally, it was true, someone that I was appointed to
represent would ask for a "real lawyer," and didn't want a public
defender. Those scenes are etched in my mind.
The Judge would get a glint in his eye and say:
"Now let me see if I have this straight. I want this on the record.
You wish to dismiss Mr. Ely as your counsel? Is that right? I want to
be clear that you know what you're doing here"-and of course the
judge would proceed to appoint some incompetent in place of me.
I of course am disabled from leaping up and saying, "Idiot, can't
you see what's happening? He's about to give you somebody who
doesn't know what he's doing!"
There's another interesting thing that I noticed. That was, that the
clients injailnever dismissed the public defenders-because they were
able to talk to other prisoners and get an idea of who was good and
who wasn't. Now, as I say, there were a few people in town who were




I had one guy not in jail I will take just a moment to tell you about.
This guy was not so sure. He was thinking about dismissing me. He
came to every case I tried, and he would sit in the front row to watch
me. His case was coming up in a couple of months. He would sit
there, and sit there, and usually at a break he would come up and
offer to testify as an alibi witness in behalf of the defendant.
[Laughter].
Don't worry, I didn't use him more than three or four times.
[Laughter].
Despite his high opinion of me, he ended up pleading guilty-but
I thought it was fun.
Now I think it is generally admitted that public defenders are
expert and capable lawyers. Several things, however, are true.
Number one, they are overburdened. I think that is universally true.
Again quoting from Hentoff, "I have for instance seen enormously
overburdened public defenders meeting their clients for the first time
only fifteen minutes before a hearing."
That may be true, but you want to know what the hearing is. If the
hearing is the arraignment where a plea has to be entered, fifteen
minutes is plenty. Unless they are essentially offering you a dismissal,
the plea is "not guilty." You don't need more than fifteen seconds to
figure out that that ought to be the plea at that point.
Of course overburden is a problem, but it is one route to expertise.
I don't think anyone who has decided to devote their life to this kind
of work is going to let it overwhelm them to the point where they are
not adequately representing their clients. People who do this kind of
work are by nature cantankerous, disagreeable people, and they will
speak up and not let it happen. [Laughter].
Second, it is sometimes alleged, and I think I have seen this played
out, that there are conflicts of interest because you are representing
so many people. It used to be an old myth that public defenders
would trade so many guilty pleas for so many reductions of pleas. I
never saw that happen. It would be flagrantly unethical. Any defense
lawyer who did that ought to serve the time for which he had just
pleaded his client.
It seems to me a public defender should behave, and this is
certainly how I behaved, and I never knew one who didn't, as if he or
she were a private lawyer and make in each case the arguments he or
she would make if it were a private client. You don't tailor your
arguments in one case because you are thinking about another client,
any more than a private lawyer should; and the judge has no more
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business pointing out in the presence of the jury that you made the
opposite argument last week than he would have in a case where you
were a private lawyer.
Now there are those three or four guys that are better. That is
true. Either they are more talented-it could happen, I
guess-[Laughter]-or they have more time and money.
Okay, we never thought Gideon meant that everybody was going to
get the best lawyer in town who would have an entire month to spend
on his case. If you think it through logically, it can't mean that. It
is a physical impossibility. Gideon can't mean that everybody gets the
defense that the richest guy in town gets. Because, as you can see,
that is a spiral that would have no end.
Of course there are incompetent lawyers. That is one reason I
would label atrocious the current Supreme Court's cutback of habeas
corpus and postconviction remedies, particularly in capital cases, but
in other cases as well. I do not think it is costing us much in terms
of either money or threats to federalism that where there is a serious
sentence, we look at criminal convictions again, even repeatedly.
But I don't think incompetent lawyers are any more common than
incompetent plumbers, incompetent car mechanics, or incompetent
doctors. Many people are incompetent at their jobs. I do not think
that lawyers are any more so than others. And I certainly do not
think-in fact, I think the opposite-that it is the case that public
defenders are less competent in criminal defense than other lawyers.
In fact, I think they are substantially more competent. Thus, I think
Hentoff is wrong. The increasing percentage of indigent defendants
being represented by public defenders seems to me a cause for
rejoicing, not a proof that Gideon has failed.
There are some decisions of the Warren Court that one can argue
have not made a hell of a lot of difference. Apparently the school
prayer decisions are widely ignored. Even Brown v. Board of Education
is a hard case in that respect. It has meant some desegregation: that
it has meant increased quality of education for African-Americans or,
for that matter, for anybody else, is a highly debatable proposition.
Miranda? I don't think it's done any harm. On the other hand, I'm
not sure it has done much good. The incidence of confession doesn't
seem to have gone down particularly; the incidence of lawyers actually
appearing in station houses is about what it was before Miranda-that
is, zero.
But Gideon? I'm sorry, but I have a lot of trouble seeing this as one
that has failed. It seems to me that it is one that has succeeded, and
in particular I wanted to enter my dissent from the inference from
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the fact that public defenders may be handling more and more cases
to the conclusion that the quality of representation is going down. I
rather suspect it is proof that it is going up.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR WILSON: Thank you, Professor Ely. Dean Bruce Jacob,
at the time he began representation of the State of Florida in Gideon
v. Wainwright, was an Assistant Attorney General, age 26. Before he
completed his work in the case, he entered private practice with what
is now the law firm of Holland & Knight, and began his teaching
career in 1965 at Emory Law School where he was a clinical teacher
and founder of the Legal Assistance for Inmates Clinic at that school.
He subsequently taught at Ohio State University where he was
Director of Clinical Programs and also did graduate work at North-
western and Harvard Law Schools. Since then, he has served as Dean
of the law schools at Mercer in Macon, Georgia, and Stetson Law
School in St. Petersburg, Florida. Dean Bruce Jacob.
Remarks of Dean Bruce R. Jacob
DEAN JACOB: I would like to thank Dean Milstein and The
American University for inviting me to be here today. It is a great
privilege to be able to participate in this panel discussion commemo-
rating the thirtieth anniversary of the decision in Gideon v. Wainwright.
During these past thirty years, I have been asked many times what it
was like to argue before the Supreme Court as a young Assistant
Attorney General of Florida in the Gideon case. When I spoke with
Dean Milstein and with Rick Wilson several weeks ago about this
program, they said that that is what they would like me to talk about.
They wanted me to answer that question. So what I will do today is
to try to give you my impressions and my recollections of what it was
like to be involved in this great case.
The Gideon case began for me in the summer of 1957. I had just
finished one semester of law school and had gotten a job in the
Panama City area in the Panhandle of Florida riding a soft-drink
truck. We went to every gas station and every grocery store, every bar,
and it was my job to go into the store and to try to persuade the
owner to take on a couple of new lines of soft drinks. One of the
places we went to that summer was the Bay Harbor Pool Room. It
was in a rundown section of Panama City, in a working class neighbor-
hood with a number of boarding houses and bars, as I recall.
Several years later, in June 1961, at about 5:30 one morning, a
breaking and entering took place in the Bay Harbor Pool Room.
Coin boxes in the cigarette machine andjuke box were broken into.
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Coins and some bottles of wine were taken. Clarence Earl Gideon,
who was living in the area at the time, was arrested and charged with
the crime. The case came before the circuit court for trial. Here is
an excerpt from the transcript as the case was called for trial:
JUDGE: Are both parties ready for trial?
PROSECUTOR: Yes
GIDEON: I am not ready, your honor.
JUDGE: Why not?
GIDEON: I have no counsel.
JUDGE: Why did you not secure counsel?
GIDEON: I request this court to appoint counsel.
JUDGE: I am sorry I cannot appoint counsel. Under the law of the
State of Florida, the only time the court can appoint counsel to
represent a defendant is when that person is charged in a capital
offense.
GIDEON: The U.S. Supreme Court says I am entitled to be
represented by counsel.
JUDGE: Let the record show that the defendant has asked for
counsel.
The court denied the request and informed him that only in a capital
case was he entitled to counsel.
Some of the judges in Florida at that time were appointing counsel
whenever the defendant in a noncapital felony case decided to plead
not guilty and go to trial. However, this was not required under the
law at that time and the judge in this particular case decided not to
appoint counsel. The Betts v. Brady rule, which was in existence at
that time, provided that counsel should be appointed whenever
special circumstances were present. For example, if a defendant was
extremely young, inexperienced, illiterate, or if he had a mental
illness, counsel should have been appointed for him under the Betts
v. Brady rule. However, an older person such as Gideon, who was
about 52 years old at the time, who had had previous experience with
the courts and who was intelligent and did not seem to have any
mental problems or any other such problems, was, under Betts v.
Brady, expected to represent himself.
Why did Gideon keep insisting that he was entitled to counsel even
though there were no special circumstances present in his case? One
reason could be that he had previously been tried for a noncapital
felony in the federal courts. In the federal courts, counsel was being
provided in every single case under the rule of Johnson v. Zerbst, a case
decided in 1938. It is possible that Gideon thought that that was the
rule in every state as well as in the federal system, and perhaps that
is why he insisted that he should have counsel.
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Gideon went to trial. He cross-examined the witnesses for the
prosecution. He decided not to take the witness stand in his own
behalf. He was convicted and given a five-year sentence for the crime
of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor. The
five-year sentence was due to the fact that he had prior convictions.
He took no appeal from his conviction. However, he filed a hand-
written habeas petition directly in the Florida Supreme Court.
At that time in Florida, a habeas petition could be filed in any
circuit court, in any district court of appeal, or in the state supreme
court, or before any judge or justice of any of these courts, challeng-
ing the legality of an individual's detention. In his petition, Gideon
merely asserted that he should have had counsel appointed. He did
not allege that any special circumstances were present in his case.
The Florida Supreme Court denied the habeas petition, merely saying
that there was no absolute right to have counsel appointed under
Supreme Court decisions up to that point.
He then filed the handwritten certiorari petition to the United States
Supreme Court. The Court granted the petition and asked counsel
on both sides to argue the question of whether or not Betts v. Brady
should be reconsidered.
At that time I was a recent law graduate working in the Florida
Attorney General's Office in Tallahassee. Some of us knew that this
was probably the vehicle which the Supreme Court would use to
overrule Betts v. Brady and to impose a flat, absolute requirement that
counsel be appointed in every single noncapital felony. We hoped,
however, that the new rule would not be retroactive. We also hoped
that the rule would not be extended to misdemeanors and appeals
because we thought it would be very difficult for the state to imple-
ment such a rule immediately.
I was working in the Criminal Appeals Division of the Attorney
General's Office, and there were four of us in that office handling
appeals and habeas petitions throughout the state. I was the only one
of the four at the time who had not yet argued a case in the Supreme
Court of the United States, and I think that is the reason why I was
chosen to handle the Gideon case. Another possible reason is that the
head of our office, Reeves Bowen, and I had worked together on
some law review articles the previous summer, and he knew that I
enjoyed legal research and that I loved legal history. He knew that I
would put a lot of time in on the case, and that also may have been
part of the reason why he allowed me to handle Gideon.
I began working on the Gideon case in 1962. Shortly afterwards, I
changed jobs and moved to Bartow, Florida, to work in the firm of
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Holland, Bevis & Smith, now known as Holland & Knight. I asked the
Attorney General of Florida, Richard Ervin, if it would be all right for
me to continue handling the Gideon case, and he said it would be fine
with him. I also asked Chesterfield Smith, who is sitting in the
audience today and who was the head of the Holland firm, if it would
be all right if I continued handling the case, and he also agreed. I
told him I would do the work after hours and that my wife, Ann,
would do the typing.
At about that time, Abe Fortas was appointed to the case to
represent Gideon. He had been a member of the Yale Law JournaL
He was a brilliant Washington lawyer. He had been the personal
attorney to LyndonJohnson and was a member of the firm of Arnold,
Fortas & Porter.
We moved to Bartow in September of 1962 and, throughout that
fall, I worked on the brief in the Gideon case. By the way, the case at
that point was called Gideon v. Cochran, because Cochran was the
Director of the State Department of Corrections. On weekends, Ann
and I would drive to either the Stetson College of Law to do research,
or we would drive to Tallahassee to do research in the State Supreme
Court Library. That library had a lot of historical and old English
materials, and that is why we went to Tallahassee quite often on
weekends to work on the case. The Supreme Court librarian
entrusted me with a key to the library, and I worked down in the
basement where all of the historical materials were kept. There were
no Xerox machines back in those days, and I would point out
excerpts that I needed to save for research purposes, and Ann would
then copy those sections onto note cards in longhand. We would
work nights at Holland, Bevis & Smith, or at the Polk County Law
Library, which I also had a key to, and, again, my wife would write
down the sections which I would ask her to copy.
The argument in our brief began with the history underlying the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Historically
there was a right to retained counsel in some instances but not a right
to have counsel appointed. We made the argument that a case-by-
case determination of the need for counsel was more consistent with
due process than a flat rule requiring counsel in every case. We
pointed out that an automatic appointment in every case had not yet
risen to the level of a fundamental right throughout the country.
Also, if an automatic rule was to be adopted, logically, counsel would
have to be provided in misdemeanors, appeals, and civil cases.
Furthermore, the question of adequate representation would become
a problem if Betts were to be overruled. Defendants would receive
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counsel but could then argue that they did not receive adequate
representation. Another important issue to us was whether a decision
overruling Betts would be retroactive. We were concerned about
turning large numbers of inmates loose at one time.
We realized that Gideon would probably be the case which would be
used by the Supreme Court to overrule Betts v. Brady, and we felt that
the other attorneys general throughout the country should be aware
of this. We knew that if the Court overruled Betts, it might also
require the appointment of counsel in misdemeanor cases and
appeals, and that this would be of great interest to the other states.
Therefore, we wrote letters to the attorneys general of all the states
in the country asking them to join with us in an amicus brief.
Later on, when Anthony Lewis interviewed me, he asked whether
this was a tactical mistake on our part, because, as you know, we had
only Alabama and a couple of other states joining us in an amicus
brief, and on the other hand something like twenty-three states filed
an amicus brief against us. I told him, and I still believe, that it was
not a mistake. We weren't concerned about tactics in this case. The
issues in the case were of such enormous importance that tactics and
strategies seemed out of place. We just wanted the other states to
know what was happening. We wanted them to be aware that the rule
could be imposed requiring counsel in all felonies, and misdemean-
ors, and appeals, and we wanted them to have an opportunity to say
what they wanted to about these issues if they so desired.
A couple of years earlier, a member of our office had argued a case
before the Supreme Court and had been criticized by the attorney
general of another state for not notifying him that the issue in that
case was before the Court. Because of this, we decided all the
attorneys general of all of the states should be notified that these
issues were about to be argued before the Supreme Court.
In the summer of 1962 we asked for a survey in the state prison
system in Florida to find out how many prisoners would be affected
by the overruling of Betts. We found that about 4500 of the 8000
prisoners then in the Florida prison system had been convicted
without the benefit of counsel. Most of them, about 4000 of the
4500, had been convicted after pleading guilty, but the others had
been convicted after going to trial. So we then knew that if the new
decision were to be in Gideon's favor and were to be made retroac-
tive, as many as 4500 of the 8000 inmates in Florida could be released
and retried or released without retrial.
The arguments were set forJanuary 1963. We were given an hour
and a half for the argument. I asked George Mentz of Alabama, the
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Assistant Attorney General who had written the amicus brief in our
behalf, to take a half hour, and I kept one hour for my argument.
To prepare for the case, I knew that we needed to take some case
opinions with us to Washington, D.C. As I said, in those days we had
no Xerox machines. The only way I could take case opinions was to
take the entire book. So I took about thirty-five books along with me
in a suitcase. We flew by propeller plane. In those days there were
some jets, but we flew in a propeller plane. We arrived in Washing-
ton, D.C. early on a Sunday before the arguments began. I met
George Mentz and we talked about the case at our hotel.
The next morning Ann, George Mentz, and I went together to the
Supreme Court. My impressions of the Supreme Court on that first
visit are still rather vivid in my mind. Before the Justices entered the
room, I noticed that each Justice had a different sized chair. Justice
White, for example, had an enormous chair, while Justice Black, as I
recall, had a little tiny chair which seemed about half the size of
Justice White's chair. The Justices came in, and the first thing they
did was swear in new members. George Mentz moved my admission,
and ChiefJustice Earl Warren welcomed me as a member of the Bar
of the Supreme Court. At that time, I was twenty-seven years old and
had just barely three years of practice, which was the minimum
required for admission to the Bar of the Supreme Court.
The rest of that day we listened to the reading of opinions. During
the reading of the opinions, the Justices would send notes to pages,
and the pages would come in and out of the Court delivering
messages, or carrying books to the Justices. Sometimes the Justices
would get up and leave. At one point, Justice White whirled around
and faced the other way, away from the audience. Justice Douglas
began writing feverishly for some time and when he finished he began
licking envelopes and pounding the envelopes shut. Later on I
learned that he wrote letters to his friends during some Court
sessions.
Justice Potter Stewart looked out at the audience and began
combing his hair with his hands. He looked straight ahead as if he
were looking into a mirror. The atmosphere was very informal and
relaxed, and it was very obvious that the members of the Supreme
Court were not at all concerned about ceremony or formality. This
was quite a contrast to the very formal atmosphere in the state courts
in Florida that I had been in in the past.
Of course all of this changed the next day when the arguments
began. The atmosphere then became very intense. The informality
disappeared, and it was all business from that point on. The reading
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of the opinions took all day Monday, and our case was scheduled to
be heard the next day. There was one case before ours: the White
Motor Company case. In the Supreme Court, there is a backup table,
and I was sitting at the backup table behind the attorneys in the White
Motor Company case. One of the attorneys was Archibald Cox, who was
the Solicitor General of the United States at the time. He was dressed
in a coat and tails. Also, Gerhard Gesell, who was an attorney at the
time-this was before he was appointed to the bench-was wearing a
coat and tails. I was wearing a blue suit. I had been concerned about
what to wear and had called the Court earlier and they said a dark
suit was fine. So I did not wear a coat and tails.
I thought that Archibald Cox's argument was the best that I had
ever heard. He looked like a basketball player, tall with a crewcut.
The words just flowed effortlessly from him. I don't think I had ever
heard anyone speak so easily and so effortlessly and so beautifully
before.
Gerhard Gesell was seated at the table in front of me. He turned
to me several times during the argument and talked with me. He had
a wonderful sense of humor. At one time, he whispered to me,
"Watch me. I'm going to have to make a jury argument." This is
what lawyers sometimes say when they know they don't have much law
on their side and they know they'll have to make a stirring emotional
argument in order to win their case. Later, of course, Archibald Cox
was the Special Prosecutor in the Watergate case, and Gerhard Gesell
became a federal judge who tried Oliver North and was involved in
other famous cases.
Finally, our case was called. It was shortly before lunch. At that
time, as I said, the case was known as Gideon v. Cochran. I had not
met Abe Fortas before this time, and he had not been at the backup
table. So I first saw him when he stood up to argue the Gideon case.
I believe at that time he was in his early fifties. He was very well
dressed in a brown suit, very dapper looking, and as he proceeded
into his argument, we took a break for lunch and Abe Fortas and I
were led downstairs into a lunch room. Earlier we had been asked
what we wanted for lunch. George Mentz had decided not to eat
lunch at the Court. Abe Fortas and I were the only two people in
that room, and a waiter brought us our food.
As we sat at the table together-the only people in this lunch
room-Abe Fortas talked to me. He was very friendly, very kind, very
warm. I remember that he talked aboutJustice Black and how much
he thought of Justice Black. He mentioned the case arising in Texas
when he had represented Lyndon Johnson regarding election results
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there. He had gone to Justice Black and gotten a stay or an order
from Justice Black, and he described to me what had happened in
that case.
We then returned back to the courtroom, and during the afternoon
session there was only one spectator in the entire courtroom-my
wife. I remember thinking how strange it was to have a completely
empty courtroom for a case which probably would eventually become
a landmark decision.
It became my turn to argue. I stepped before the podium and my
first impression was that I was in a pit. The Justices were very close
to the podium, and they were seated above me, and they were spread
out very far to my left and my right. This was different from the
arrangements in the state courts in which I had argued previously. In
those courts, the podium was set back farther. The judges were
seated closer together, and the speaker did not get the impression of
being in a pit. The podium had lights on it. There was a green light,
a yellow light, and a red light for when the speaker was supposed to
stop speaking.
I began to make my prepared argument, but the minute I began
there were questions from members of the Court. I was used to the
Florida Supreme Court and the Florida appellate courts, where very
few questions were asked. These Justices questioned everything.
There was no reverence for established rules, and they were willing to
reexamine every rule and every concept down to its very foundation.
I had not been used to this kind of questioning before.
At times a Justice would ask a question which he knew the answer
to but he would use me as a kind of a foil, trying to make a point with
another Justice. He would ask me the question, then look down the
row at another Justice-as if to say this is a point I want you to
understand.
In answer to a question about Johnson v. Zerbst, I said that that
decision was at least in part based upon the supervisory powers of the
United States Supreme Court over the lower federal courts. When I
said this, I got the strong impression that this made Justice Black
angry. He became red in the face. At this point, Justice Harlan, who
was probably the Justice whose views were most favorable to our
position, helped me out by saying to me, "Careful now, don't go too
far."
The questioning was absolutely brutal, as far as I was concerned.
There were about forty questions asked, and I believe that every
Justice, except Justice Douglas, asked at least one question of me
during that argument. I felt like I was caught in a crossfire. It was
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difficult to know which question to take next, and difficult to respond
with so many questions coming from so many different directions.
When I sat down, George Mentz stood up and argued. Near the
end of his argument, one of the Justices said, "You don't really expect
to win this case, do you?" George Mentz answered, "Your Honors,
hope springs eternal." This of course drew a laugh from the
members of the Court.
After the argument had been concluded, I felt bad, thinking that
I had not done a good job, because the questioning had been so
relentless. Abe Fortas came up to me in the hall and shook my hand.
He could tell that I felt down and, to make me feel better, he said,
'You know, you have a wonderful way before the Court." Of course
this made me feel very good.
For the flight back to Florida, we went to the Dulles Airport. In
those days, apparently not many people traveled by air, because the
airport was empty. My wife and I were the only two travelers in the
entire airport. I had a suitcase full of books, and in those days
luggage had to be weighed. I think it was about fifty pounds
overweight, and I had to pay a $50 fine because I had too much
weight.
After the case had been argued, Cochran stepped down as Director
of the State Department of Corrections, and Louis Wainwright
became the Director. I wrote the Court and informed them of this
change. I never received an answer from the Court, but when the
opinion was released, the name had been changed to Gideon v.
Wainwright. The opinion, of course, was retroactive, and about 4300
inmates were released under the Gideon decision. Surprisingly to us
in Florida, there were studies done which showed that not many of
these inmates committed further crimes. Of course this was very good
news to all of us.
There was a newspaper strike at the time, and Anthony Lewis
apparently didn't have a job. Temporarily, his newspaper was shut
down and that is why he wrote the book, Gideon's Trumpet.
Several years later, Abe Fortas was appointed to the Supreme Court,
and at that time I was teaching at Emory University School of Law.
Our Dean invited him to come to be our Law Day speaker, telling
him in the letter that I was on the faculty. Justice Fortas accepted,
and I will never forget when he came to our school. He entered the
main lobby. The Dean was there, and the members of the faculty,
and there seemed to be hundreds of students crowded around us.
Justice Fortas and I shook hands, and at that point he turned to the
Dean and he said, "Dean, you have a good man here in Bruce Jacob."
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Justice Fortas has always been one of my heroes, as you can probably
guess. He certainly was good to me, and I have always had the very
highest regard for him.
After the Gideon opinion had been released, the case went back to
Bay County for retrial. An attorney was appointed to represent
Gideon, and he was acquitted at that second trial. There was a
transcript made of the first trial. There had been three key witnesses
in that first trial. One was a woman sitting on her porch who said
that she saw Gideon walking toward her from the Bay Harbor Pool
Room carrying some wine bottles. She saw him get into a telephone
booth, and then a taxi arrived. A second witness was the cab driver
who said that Gideon had a lot of small change with him, and that he
paid the entire fare in small change.
The key witness, however, was Henry Cook. He was the only one
who could actually place Gideon in the Bay Harbor Pool Room. He
said that he had walked by the Pool Room at 5:30 in the morning,
had looked in through the window, and had seen Gideon, whom he
had known previously, inside. Then he said he saw Gideon come out
the side door, walk to the sidewalk, and walk down the street to the
telephone booth carrying some wine bottles. Henry Cook clearly was
critical to the state's case. It is my understanding that the attorney for
Gideon at the second trial was able to discredit Cook by pointing out
that Cook initially had been a suspect in the case himself.
This was an interesting experience for a young lawyer. I would not
recommend to others doing this at such an early age, but I certainly
learned a great deal. If I could have chosen the side I preferred in
the case, I would have taken the other side. Even so, I did see some
merit in the state's position. As I worked on the case, I was convinced
that the state should provide counsel in all felonies, but I also felt that
the state should be allowed to experiment with different ways of
accomplishing this, and that the state should be allowed to do this on
its own, without being forced to do so by the Federal Government.
Now that I am older and have had more experience, I realize that
the state never would have done this on its own. The state would not
have provided counsel in all serious crimes without being compelled
to do so by the Supreme Court of the United States. The Gideon case
was absolutely necessary in order to accomplish this.
Again, it is a great privilege being here and participating in this
panel discussion. Thank you very much for inviting me.
PROFESSOR WILSON: Thank you, Dean. Angela Jordan Davis was
not involved in the litigation of Gideon v. Wainwright, but she is, like
me, a child of the Gideon v. Wainwright decision. She is a true public
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defender. She graduated from Harvard Law School in 1981 and, after
a clerkship with Chief Judge Neumann of the D.C. Court of Appeals,
became a public defender with the Public Defender Service in
Washington, D.C., one of the finest offices in the country unquestion-
ably. After five-and-a-half years as a trial attorney with that office, she
became Deputy Director where she served for three years, and has
now served as Director of that office for the past two years. Angela
Jordan Davis.
Remarks of Angela Jordan Davis, Esq.
ANGELAJORDAN DAVIS: Imagine practicing law in the basement of
an old, dilapidated building with peeling paint, asbestos, broken
toilets. Imagine sharing a small office cluttered with broken furniture
with one, maybe two other lawyers. Envision having to consult with
your officemates before you meet with your client just to get some
privacy. Imagine sharing a secretary with seven or eight other lawyers.
And imagine working in these conditions sixty to seventy hours per
week making one-half, perhaps one-third of what other lawyers with
your same experience are making.
The scenario I just described to you is not necessarily a description
of the typical public defender service in this country. In fact, it is a
precise description of the office that has the reputation of being the
top public defender service in the country, and that is my office, the
public defender service for the District of Columbia.
When I was asked to come here and reflect upon my own experi-
ences as a public defender, I was concerned that my own experiences
would not be typical of the experiences of most public defenders in
this country. I was concerned that if I talked about my own experi-
ence, solely about my own experience as a public defender, that it
would give the erroneous impression that all goes well with indigent
defense in this country. Because, despite the description of my office
that I just gave-and it is a very accurate description-the Public
Defender Service for the District of Columbia provides excellent
representation for its clients, representation that I think Clarence Earl
Gideon, or Michael Milken, for that matter, would be proud and
lucky to have. Because, despite the deplorable physical plant and
expected low public defender salaries, PDS provides excellent
representation for its clients. It provides extensive training and
supervision for its lawyers, a staff of trained social workers, a staff of
investigators, and funding to hire expert services without the prior
approval of judges.
However, on this anniversary, this thirtieth anniversary of perhaps
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for me, anyway, the greatest case in the history of the Supreme Court,
I will not regale you with a presentation on how wonderful PDS is.
Because it is sad but true, Mr. Ely, that quality representation for poor
people in this country is the exception, not the rule. Most public
defenders and appointed counsel in a criminal case don't have access
to intensive specialized training before they handle cases. Most of
them have no training at all except law school, and we all know, or as
those of you who are still in law school will find out, that that will not
prepare you at all-unless you are in Ric's clinic-to represent clients.
Most lawyers representing poor people accused of crimes don't
have access to a staff of social workers, or a staff of investigators. And
most of them must request funds for expert services from judges that
rarely approve adequate funding for these requests. Most defenders
of indigent people do not represent their clients free from the
pressures imposed byjudges, politicians, and others who literally hold
the keys to the bank of limited funds available to represent the poor,
or who have the power to fire the defender at will. That is the dismal
legacy of Gideon.
I have to pause here to say that I agree that public defenders are
great lawyers. Most public defenders and many assigned counsel are
wonderful lawyers who are committed to what they do and want to do
a great job for their clients, and many of them do a wonderful job.
But no matter how great you are as a lawyer, you can't do a wonderful
job for your client if you don't have the resources to do your job, or
if you feel pressure from judges or others around you who discourage
you from being zealous in your work. So it is certainly not necessarily
about ability, but it is certainly about resources.
Time does not really permit me to completely describe the sorry
state of indigent defense in this country today. Most of you have
probably heard the horror stories of recent law graduates who have
no experience representing people in capital cases or, as Mr. Lewis
mentioned, drunk lawyers, or sleeping lawyers who haven't prepared
at all who are representing people in capital cases. These horror
stories happen far too frequently. But unfortunately, inadequate
representation in noncapital cases, many of which involve significant
periods of incarceration, also occurs routinely in this country. Again,
time does not permit me to relate the countess examples which
illustrate this fact, and unfortunately the examples are really more the
rule, I think, than the exception.
Mr. Lewis mentioned Indianapolis. In Indianapolis, part-time
public defenders are paid, and when I say "part-time," that means that
they work part-time as a public defender-I don't know how anyone
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can do that-but they work part-time as a public defender, and then
they have their own practice with clients that pay. But part-time
public defenders are paid about $20,000 a year regardless of their
caseload, and they practice exclusively before judges who hire them
and who have the power to fire them if they don't like what they're
saying or doing in the courtroom. They are provided no office space
or support staff. Many of them carry a caseload of seventy cases or
more, and they rarely visit their incarcerated clients before their court
dates.
In Detroit there is a financial incentive for court-appointed lawyers
to encourage their clients to plead guilty. That is because they are
paid the same thing for certain categories of cases whether the client
pleads guilty or whether the client goes to trial. In other words, if
they spend a half hour on a misdemeanor plea or 100 hours on a
misdemeanor trial, they are paid the same thing. So there is an
incentive to plead clients guilty.
In Harlan County, Kentucky, the public defender carries a caseload
of 120 felony cases, and the State of Kentucky spends only about $100
per felony and misdemeanor case. In Atlanta, a public defender was
found to have an illegal part-time job moonlighting, representing
clients in guilty pleas in another county as he neglected his own
caseload, for which he was being paid a salary. In New Orleans, a
public defender was so overwhelmed with cases that he convinced a
judge to rule that his excessive caseload of over seventy pending cases
prevented him from providing effective assistance of counsel. And
even in a well-respected office like the Legal Aid Society of New York,
which has wonderful, committed lawyers, many of them have
caseloads of seventy cases or more, making it impossible to spend
adequate time on each case. And budget cuts all over the country,
not surprisingly, are decimating already financially strapped indigent
defense systems in New Jersey, Tennessee, Florida, Louisiana, the
District of Columbia, numerous counties in California, Illinois,
Maryland, and in virtually every state.
The budget for the Federal Criminal Justice Act, which pays
assigned counsel to represent poor people in federal criminal cases,
was depleted before the end of 1991 and long before the end of 1992.
Hundreds of lawyers who had represented clients were not paid until
the budget was supplemented on an emergency basis. Here we are
again in 1993 with the same thing happening. Funds to pay these
lawyers will be depleted by the end of this month unless these funds
are again supplemented on an emergency basis. This is the legacy of
Gideon v. Wainwright, Mr. Ely.
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When Justice Black said that lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries, surely he did not intend that the lawyer
should be a warm body standing next to the client processing the case
through the system. Indeed, Gideon or any indigent person charged
with a crime would do better to represent himself than to have a
lawyer with seventy other cases who either has no time or no interest
in representing him. The inequalities in our criminal justice system
should instill a sense of moral outrage in all of us.
We should all be outraged that there are, in essence, different
systems of justice for the rich and the poor, for white people and for
people of color. Poor people charged with crimes have no political
power. They have no voice. If we wish to instill some sense ofjustice
in our criminal justice system, if we believe in the Sixth Amendment
and the principles of Gideon, we should be that voice. All of us. We
must remind our lawmakers, our judges, and all of our citizens that
our criminal justice system is a mockery unless all citizens, regardless
of their race, regardless of their economic status, are represented by
able, competent counsel. We should also be equally outraged that
public defenders and assigned counsel are so devalued in our
criminal justice system, and are held to a different standard of
performance than prosecutors or judges.
Now I want to talk a minute about being devalued. I was thinking
about this. Everybody knows that people look down on public
defenders, but I was thinking about it. Public defenders sometimes,
unfortunately, look down on themselves. It is sort of like oppressed
people who are discriminated against and oppressed. They start to
believe what the oppressors are saying about them. They start to have
low self-esteem. It seems like that happens to us as public defenders.
We think we are supposed to be poor. We think we are supposed to
have broken down chairs, and dilapidated furniture. We think we are
supposed to be like that. We have been so devalued in our society,
even though we work as hard as uptown lawyers who make lots of
money-$300, $275 an hour, working on some discrete point in some
corporate case. We are fighting for life and liberty, the most
important things, and yet we devalue ourselves.
Sometimes we don't stand up and make noise about it because we
don't have time, because we have so many cases, and we are working
for clients and we don't have time to stand up and scream. We are
held to a different standard of performance than prosecutors or
judges. Are prosecutors asked to do their jobs without pay? Is their
pay withheld until they have closed a case, or completed a trial? Are
prosecutors or judges paid by the case, $300 for misdemeanors, $750
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for a felony? Are they required to provide their own office space and
support staff? Are prosecutors hired by judges to work in their
courtrooms? Do prosecutors have to worry that if they fight too hard,
or litigate too zealously, they might be fired? Has any prosecutor ever
been fired for circulating a memo in his office inspiring his staff to
fight harder? That happened to a public defender.
Does any judge even have the power to fire a prosecutor if he
wanted to? Of course not! It would be unseemly and unjust to most
citizens in our society if either prosecutors or judges were treated this
way. Then why are we so accepting of this very treatment of those
who defend the poor? Surely we don't suggest that judges or
prosecutors are more important than defenders in our criminal justice
system? Justice Black, in Gideon v. Wainwright, said:
Governments, both state and federal, quite properly spend vast
sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of
crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to
protect the public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there
are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire
the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses.
That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who
have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications
of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries.
6
On this thirtieth anniversary of this most important case, we all
have much to accomplish. Like a lot of other movements of the 60s,
it sometime seems as if we are not making a lot of progress, like we
are moving backwards instead of forward. I say this because in the
early 1970s-in the early 1970s-the United States Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration spent nearly $10 million on indigent
defense, nearly $10 million. But in the late 1980s, the Bureau of
Justice Assistance excluded defense services from eligibility from
federal funds established to improve the functioning of the criminal
justice system. Despite legislation which presumably corrected this
exclusion, only a small percentage of these funds have gone to
defender offices. We are going backwards. This must change.
As legislators saw fit to pass legislation increasing penalties, and the
war on drugs increased arrests and prosecutions, more resources were
allotted for law enforcement and prosecution, but not for defender
services, widening the imbalance between prosecution and defense.
The recession and budget cuts ensued, and indigent defense became
6. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
1993]
48 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVmW
an easy target. Funding for indigent defense must be increased. We
can't have a system in which the lack of money discourages, or even
prevents a lawyer from pursuing the best interests of his clients. But
more money alone will not solve the problem. No one should handle
a criminal case without adequate training.
Life and liberty are our greatest values in this society. Surely we
can't place their fate in the hands of incompetent or overworked
lawyers. In addition to adequate training and funding, we must assure
the independence of defenders. A criminal defense attorney must
work for his client, not for the judge, or the mayor, or the governor,
or anyone else. No lawyer should fear that she will be punished, or
perhaps even fired, for zealously representing her client. The defense
attorney should be encouraged to pursue every possible means of
achieving her client's best interest.
Each of us has much work to do. Whether we are defenders, or
prosecutors, or judges, or professors, or law students, or lawyers who
are not directly involved in the criminal justice system, we all have an
obligation. We must lobby our legislators and our policymakers to
provide adequate funding and training for defenders of the poor, and
to assure their independence. Each of us should pledge to make the
thirty-fifth anniversary of Gideon a celebration, and not just a
commemoration. Let's all pledge to make the dream of Gideon a
reality. Thank you.
PROFESSOR WILSON: I want to thank all of our panelists this
afternoon. This has been a wonderful afternoon. It has been my
deep honor to be a part of these proceedings. On behalf of the
Washington College of Law, I want to again thank the Consortium,
the firm of Arnold & Porter, and especially justice Brennan for your
attendance this afternoon, and all of our other guests. This is the
end of our session this afternoon, and I would like to invite our
invited guests to attend a reception in Mary Graydon Center across
the Quad. Thank you very much for your attendance.
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